This stub is based on some of the material in Operational Accountability Discussion, but not all of it. The material here refers mainly to the role of friendlies in general (field work) Operational Security; see also Agent Pay for the role of friendlies in finance.
Numerous friendly accounting clerks, payroll officers, supply sergeants, motorpool attendants are prepared to provide "special treatment" when they receive a requisition with a small and easily removable green triangle sticker or code on it. (Christian Conkle)
- There could also be friendly judges, forensic team investigators, etc., for when the information is not simply too outlandish. (Christian Conkle)
- The problem with this friendly-network theory is the increasing risk of a leak. If each agent required about 5 friendlies on average to maintain the cover-up, that would be almost 400 friendlies of this administrative type. Overlap and a focus on higher levels (a federal rather than a number of state judges, a high-level expense auditor rather than several lesser payroll clerks etc.) would lower the number. (Christian Conkle)
Real-world government directives don't always have to make sense, you're just expected to follow them. No one asks questions anyway, especially if there's less work for whoever would normally have handled a specific item of business. (Christian Conkle)
Very few friendlies should have any idea what they are really involved in; your typical friendly should be convinced that their contact agent is a lone wolf operative trying to save the world, or that the cell of a few agents is the only such group, and that he or she is one of the only people in all the world that they can turn to to ask for help. A friendly should be shocked to learn that there are DOZENS of agents and HUNDREDS of friendlies "just like me" out there. By the time a friendly learns that much, it should be time to reevaluate whether the friendly is trustworthy enough to be made a full agent, or not. (Shane Ivey)
You are only seven people away from knowing anything you want to know. A drafter for a phone company is six people away from the guy who carries the launch codes for nuclear missiles. DG people are plugged into the whole intel community, they can be expected to know someone who knows someone who can do almost anything. Read any of Richard Marcinko's books to find out how to run a black operation on a shoestring. It's so simple it's scary. (Charles O. Baucum Jr.)